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The amplitude of US business cycles has declined during the last 20 years,
with all macroeconomic variables displaying a lower volatility than in the
previous 30 years. In this paper we investigate the extent to which the lower
volatility can be explained by innovations in ﬁnancial markets that allow for
greater ﬁnancial ﬂexibility of ﬁrms.
We are motivated by two sets of empirical regularities about the dynamics
of the ﬁnancial structure of ﬁrms. First, corporate debt drops dramatically
during recessions. This suggests that recessions are periods in which ﬁrms
must restructure their ﬁnancial position. If ﬁrms cannot compensate the
debt reduction with new equity, they must cut production and investment
which has further recessionary consequences.
The second regularity is that the change in debt and the issue of new
equity in the business sector has become more volatile during the last two
decades. Because changes in debt and equity issuance are negatively cor-
related, these ﬁndings suggest that ﬁrms have become more ﬂexible in the
choice of their ﬁnancial structure. This greater ﬂexibility is, in our frame-
work, the driving force for the milder business cycle.
During the 80s and the 90s various innovations have emerged in the area
of ﬁrm ﬁnancing. So far as equity payout policies are concerned, ﬁrms have
gained greater ﬂexibility in issuing and repurchasing shares. The ability
and ﬂexibility to issue debt has also changed as ﬁrms have now access to a
wider variety of instruments. In particular, the various forms of asset backed
securities represent eﬀective ways of collateralization. These two changes are
closely related to the empirical regularities discussed above and will play an
important role in our analysis.
Financial volatility joint with real stability poses challenges to some of
the existing explanations for more stable business cycles. Indeed, if the good
fortune of being exposed to milder shocks is the main explanation, then it is
not clear, a priori, why ﬁnancial variables have not also become more stable.
If better monetary policies are the main explanation, then it also begs the
question through what mechanisms this was achieved without also stabilizing
key ﬁnancial variables. In this paper we use a theoretical framework that can
account for the contrasting evolutions in ﬁnancial and real volatility.
In our model, ﬁrms ﬁnance investment with equity and debt. Debt con-
tracts are not fully enforceable and the ability to borrow is limited by a
no-default constraint which depends on the expected lifetime proﬁtability of
1the ﬁrm. As lifetime proﬁtability varies with the business cycle, so does a
ﬁrm’s ability to borrow. In this regard, our model is related to Kiyotaki &
Moore (1997), Bernanke, Gertler & Gilchrist (1999), and Mendoza & Smith
(2005), in the sense that asset prices movements aﬀect the ability to borrow.
Our model, however, diﬀers in one important dimension: we allow ﬁrms to
issue new equity in addition to reinvesting proﬁts. This extra margin plays a
central role in our model. In particular, it is the greater ﬂexibility in issuing
equity, net of repurchases, that allows for milder business cycles.1
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we discuss some em-
pirical evidence on real and ﬁnancial cycles in the US economy. Section 3
presents the model and characterizes some of its analytical properties. After
calibrating the model in Section 4, we study the impact of ﬁnancial innova-
tions in Section 5. Section 6 examines some additional features of the model,
and 7 concludes.
2 Real and ﬁnancial cycles in the U.S.
This section presents the main empirical observations that motivate our pa-
per. It describes some features of the real and ﬁnancial cycles and the extent
to which these features have changed in the last two decades.
Figure 1 plots the log of real GDP in the nonfarm business sector. The
ﬁgure clearly shows the reduction in output volatility during the last 20 years.
A similar pattern is also observed in other macroeconomic variables including
total factor productivity.
Although the lower business cycle volatility has been emphasized in sev-
eral studies, the causes of these changes are still under investigation.2 In
this paper we examine the role of ﬁnancial markets innovations. Campbell &
Hercowitz (2005) have also studied the role of ﬁnancial innovations, focusing
on the residential mortgage market.3 Our focus, motivated by key stylized
1There are other studies that allow for equity issuance over the business cycle. See, for
example, Choe, Masulis & Nanda (1993), Covas and den Haan (2005), Leary and Roberts
(2005), Levy & Hennessy (2005). The main focus of these studies is in the ﬁnancial
behavior of ﬁrms, not the macro impact of ﬁnancial innovations.
2See Kim & Nelson (1999), McConnell & Perez-Quiros (2000), Stock & Watson (2002),
Comin and Philippon (2005), Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes & Krause (2006), and Arias,
Hansen & Ohanian (2006).
3Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes & Krause (2006) present some empirical evidence support-
ing the view that ﬁnancial market developments have played an important role. Consid-
2Figure 1: GDP in the nonfarm business sector.
facts about the dynamics of the ﬁnancial structure of ﬁrms, is on ﬁnancial
innovations that aﬀect the business sector of the economy.
The top panel of Figure 2 plots the credit market liabilities in the nonfarm
business sector, as a fraction of GDP produced in this sector. Financial data
is from the Flow of Funds Accounts of the Federal Reserve Board. Credit
market liabilities include only liabilities that are directly related to credit
markets instruments. It does not include, for instance, tax liabilities. We
refer to this variable as ‘outstanding debt’.
There are two important patterns to emphasize. The ﬁrst pattern is that
outstanding debt, as a fraction of GDP, has increased during the last 50 years.
In the early ﬁfties this ratio was only 35 percent while in 2005 it has reached
about 85 percent. The second pattern is the increased volatility of debt.
While the debt-to-output ratio has been growing at a relatively stable pace
ering a sample of 25 countries, they show a relationship between the decline in output
volatility and the change in the ratio between private credit and GDP.
3Figure 2: Financial structure in the nonfarm business sector.
4during the ﬁfties and sixties, in the last three decades it has displayed large
swings. Moreover, the debt exposure tends to decline dramatically during
or after a recession. This suggests that recessions lead ﬁrms to restructure
their ﬁnancial exposure and the magnitude of restructuring is severe when
the debt exposure is high.
The bottom panel of Figure 2 plots net payments to equity holders and
net debt repurchases in the nonfarm business sector. Both variables are ex-
pressed as a fraction of nonfarm business GDP. Equity payout is deﬁned
as dividends minus equity issues (net of share repurchases) of nonﬁnancial
corporate businesses, minus net proprietor’s investment in nonfarm noncor-
porate businesses. They capture the net payments from the business sector
to business owners (shareholders of corporations and non-corporate business
owners). Debt repurchases are deﬁned as the reduction in outstanding debt.
This ﬁgure also displays two important features. The ﬁrst is that both
variables have become more volatile during the last two decades. The second
is that equity payouts have become negatively correlated with debt repur-
chases.
The properties of real and ﬁnancial cycles are further characterized in
Table 1. The table reports the standard deviations and cross correlations
of three variables: equity payout, debt repurchase, and the log of GDP in
the nonﬁnancial corporate sector and in the nonfarm business sector. Equity
payout and debt repurchase are in fractions of value added produced in the
sector. The table also reports the standard deviation of net worth. This
provides information about the volatility of the stock of internal funds. All
variables have been detrended using a band-pass ﬁlter that preserves cycles of
1.5-8 years. Alternative detrending using, for instance, the Hodrik-Prescott
ﬁlter or a linear trend would provide a similar picture.
The standard deviation of equity payouts, as fraction of GDP, has in-
creased substantially in the most recent period 1984-2005, compared to the
earlier period 1952-1983. The increase in volatility is also observed for net
worth. This is in sharp contrast to the standard deviation of GDP that has
declined by half. The volatility of debt repurchase does not show a clear
increase in volatility which seems to contradict the pattern shown in Figure
2. This is because most of the increase in the volatility of debt is at low
frequencies, which are captured by the trend.
The cross correlations are consistent with the pattern shown in Figure 2.
In particular, ﬁrms tend to issue more debt (lower debt repurchase) during
booms. This is true in both subperiods. Therefore, the co-movement of debt
5Table 1: Business cycles properties of ﬁrm ﬁnancing.
Corporate sector Nonfarm business
1952-83 1984-05 Late/Early 1952-83 1984-05 Late/Early
Standard deviation
EquPay 0.56 1.24 2.24 0.69 1.09 1.56
DebtRep 1.53 1.49 0.97 1.09 1.37 1.25
Net Worth 1.18 2.58 2.19 1.12 2.26 2.01
GDP 2.70 1.52 0.56 2.35 1.17 0.50
Correlation
Corr(EquPay,GDP) 0.42 0.47 -0.03 0.52
Corr(DebtRep,GDP) -0.69 -0.63 -0.73 -0.75
Corr(EquPay,DebtRep) -0.56 -0.60 -0.12 -0.62
Notes: Financial data is from the Flow of Funds Accounts of the Federal Reserve Board. Equity payout
in the corporate sector is net dividends minus net issue of corporate equity. Equity payout in the
nonfarm business sector is equity payout in the corporate sector minus proprietor’s net investment. Debt
repurchase is the negative of the change in credit market liabilities. Both variables are divided by their
sectorial GDP. Net worth is the log of net worth, measured at market values, deﬂated by the price index
for the nonfarm value added. GDP is the log of sectorial real GDP (corporate or nonfarm business).
All variables are detrended with a band-pass ﬁlter that preserves cycles of 1.5-8 years (Baxter and King
(1999). See Appendix A for more details.
with output has not changed signiﬁcantly. Equity payout is positively cor-
related with output and negatively correlated with debt repurchases. These
correlations are unambiguous especially in the second sample period. Thus,
the substitution between debt and equity seems to be a strong empirical reg-
ularity.4 Similar cyclical properties are also found by Covas and den Haan
(2005) using data from Compustat ﬁrms (including those involved in mergers
and acquisitions).
We summarize the main empirical facts outlined in this section as follows:
1. The business cycle volatility has declined during the last 20 years.
2. The debt exposure has increased during the last 50 years.
3. Debt repurchases are counter-cyclical and equity payouts are pro-cyclical.
4. Equity payout and debt repurchases have become more volatile during
the last 20 years.
4Note that including a fraction of proprietors’ income into equity payouts wouldn’t
signiﬁcantly aﬀect the statistics reported in Table 1.
6The ﬁrst fact has been emphasized in several empirical studies and is
well-known. The others (especially 3 and 4) are less known and explored in
the macro literature. Starting in the next section we develop a model that
captures some of the key changes in ﬁnancial markets as described above. The
goal is to evaluate the extent to which these innovations have contributed to
reducing the real business cycle volatility.
3 Model
We ﬁrst describe the environment in which an individual ﬁrm operates. After
characterizing the problem solved by an individual ﬁrm, we describe the
remaining section of the model and deﬁne the general equilibrium.
3.1 Financial and investment decisions of ﬁrms
There is a continuum of ﬁrms, in the [0,1] interval, with the following revenue
function π(st;kt,lt). The revenue function is concave in the inputs of capital,
kt, and labor, lt, and displays decreasing returns to scale in these two inputs.
The assumption of decreasing returns implies that the ﬁrm generates positive
proﬁts and its market value is above the replacement cost of capital. The
revenue function also depends on the aggregate state of the economy st as
will be made precise below.
Firms retain the ability to generate proﬁts with probability p. This vari-
able is interpreted as the probability that the ﬁrm retains the control of a
particular market. The uncertainty about market retention is revealed at the
beginning of the period. In this event, the ﬁrm sells its activities to a new
ﬁrm at the price Lt and exits. By purchasing the activities of the exiting
ﬁrm, the new entrant ﬁrm starts with the same states as incumbents so that
all ﬁrms are alike. The law of large numbers implies that in each period there
is a fraction 1 − p of ﬁrms that lose their markets. The probability p is sto-
chastic and follows a ﬁrst order Markov process with transition probability
Γ(p0/p). The change in p is the only source of uncertainty in the model.
The ﬁrm raises funds with equity and debt. Debt is preferred to equity
because of its tax advantage as in Hennessy and Whited (2005). Given rt
the interest rate and τ the tax rate, the eﬀective cost of debt is rt(1 − τ)
and the present value of one unit of debt is 1/Rt = 1/[1 + rt(1 − τ)]. The
ability to borrow, however, is bounded by the limited enforceability of debt
7contracts as the ﬁrm can default at the end of the period and divert some of
the ﬁrm’s resources. These resources, denoted by D(kt,lt), increase with the
scale of production, that is, with the inputs of capital and labor. Let V t be
the value of the ﬁrm at the end of the period, after paying dividends. This
is deﬁned as:









where mt+j is the relevant stochastic discount factor, as deﬁned later, and
¯ dj+j is the net payment to shareholders.5 Appendix B describes in detail
the renegotiation process and shows that incentive-compatibility imposes the
following constraint:
V t ≥ φD(kt,lt)
where φ is a parameter that captures the degree of enforcement. Because
higher debt reduces the value of the ﬁrm for the shareholders (left-hand-
side), this constraint imposes a borrowing limit. The value of the ﬁrm V t
can be interpreted as a collateral and 1/φ the degree to which the ﬁrm’s
assets are collateralizable. As we will see later, one way to capture ﬁnancial
innovations is through the change in φ.
The market retention probability p plays a crucial role in the determi-
nation of the ﬁrm’s value because it aﬀects the eﬀective discount factor. In
particular, with a persistent fall in p, the retention rates are also expected
to be smaller in the future. This reduces the hazard rate Π
j−1
`=1pt+`, which
in turn reduces the ﬁrm’s value V t and leads to a tighter constraint: If the
ﬁrm cannot raise enough equity to reduce the debt exposure and increase the
value of the ﬁrm, it will be forced to reduce the inputs of capital and labor.
In order to capture the frictions associated with issuing and repurchasing
shares as well as paying dividends, we assume that the ﬁrm’s payout is subject
to a quadratic adjustment cost. The total cost of payout, dt, is:
ϕ(dt) = dt + κ · (dt − d)
2
where κ ≥ 0, and d represents the long-run payout target level. Lintner
(1956) showed ﬁrst that managers are concerned about smoothing dividends
over time, further conﬁrmed by subsequent studies. The function ϕ(.) also
5In the general equilibrium environment we will deﬁne below, there will be a unique
relevant stochastic discount factor, so that Etmt+1 = 1/(1 + rt).
8captures the possible costs associated with share repurchases and equity is-
suance.6
The parameter κ aﬀects the degree of market incompleteness. When
κ = 0 the economy is essentially equivalent to a frictionless environment.
In this case, debt adjustments triggered by the enforcement constraint can
be costlessly accommodated through changes in ﬁrm equity. When κ > 0,
the substitution between debt and equity becomes costly and will aﬀect the
ﬁrm’s production decisions. Changes in κ identify the second channel through
which ﬁnancial innovations are captured by our model.
Firm’s problem: We write the problem recursively. The states of the
ﬁrm are capital k and debt b, in addition to the aggregate states that we will
deﬁne later. Conditional on retaining its market, the ﬁrm chooses the input
of labor l, the payout d, the new capital k0, the new debt b0, to maximize:
V (s;k,b) = max
l,d,k0,b0
(














The function V (s;k,b) is the value of the ﬁrm conditional on market
retention and V (s;k0,b0) is the value at the end of the period (after all relevant
choices are made, including the payment of dividends, the choice of next
period capital and the repayment of the previous debt). The optimization
problem is subject to the budget and enforcement constraints.
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6The convexity assumption is consistent with the work of Hansen & Torregrosa (1992)
and Altinkilic & Hansen (2000), showing that underwriting fees display increasing marginal
cost in the size of the oﬀering. The function ϕ(.), however, also captures the agency
problems associated with the issuance or repurchase of shares.
9The ﬁrm will retain the market for the intermediate good with probability
p0 and loses it with probability 1 − p0. In the latter event, the shareholders
sell the activities of the ﬁrm to the new entrant ﬁrm at the price L(s0;k0,b0).
This price depends on the relative bargaining power between the exiting
and the new ﬁrm. For analytical convenience we assume that the exiting
ﬁrm has all the bargaining power and extracts the whole net surplus, that
is, L(s;k,b) = V (s;k,b) − V (s;0,0).7 We would like to emphasize that
alternative assumptions about the bargaining power would not change the
key properties of the model.
In solving the problem, the ﬁrm takes as given all prices, including the
stochastic discount factor m and the gross interest rate R. The ﬁrst order
conditions can be written as:

























where µ is the lagrange multiplier associated with the enforcement constraint
and subscripts denote derivatives. The detailed derivation is provided in
Appendix C.
These conditions characterize the optimal policy of the ﬁrm. To build
some intuition, let’s consider ﬁrst the case without adjustment costs, that
is, κ = 0. Thus, ϕd(d) = ϕd(d0) = 1. Then condition (5) becomes (1 +
µ)REm0 = 1, which implies that the Lagrange multiplier µ is fully deter-
mined by aggregate prices. From conditions (3) and (4) we can see that
the production and investment choices of the ﬁrm only depend on aggregate
prices. Changes in p aﬀect the investment policy of the ﬁrm only if they
change the aggregate prices R and m0. But as long as the aggregate prices
are not aﬀected, the policy of the ﬁrm does not change. Furthermore, we
7If the two ﬁrms do not reach an agreement, the value of the new ﬁrm would be V (s;0,0)
because it starts with zero capital and debt. This implies that the new ﬁrm is unable to
produce in the current period because it does not have capital. If the two ﬁrms reach an
agrement, the value of the new ﬁrm would be V (s;k,b). Therefore, the net surplus from
reaching an agrement is V (s;k,b) − V (s;0,0). This is the price obtained by the exiting
ﬁrm under the assumption that it has all the bargaining power.
10observe that, if the default constraint is not binding in neither the current
nor the next period, the Lagrange multiplier is µ = µ0 = 0. Then the ﬁrst
order condition for the choice of labor and capital become πl(s;k,l) = 0 and
Em0πk(s0;k0,l0) = 1, that is, the marginal productivities are equalized to
their marginal costs.
These results no longer hold when κ > 0. In this case changes in the value
of the ﬁrm lead to changes in the production choices. In particular, a fall in
the value of the ﬁrm will make the default constraint tighter which increases
µ. In the ﬁrst period, this will lead to a reduction in the demand of labor
l. Then, starting from the next period, the input of capital will also fall. In
equilibrium, of course, the changes in the ﬁrms’ policies will also aﬀect the
aggregate prices R and m0. To derive these eﬀects we need to characterize
the general equilibrium.
3.2 Full model and general equilibrium
We now complete the description of the remaining pieces of the model in order
to deﬁne the general equilibrium. First we specify the market structure and
technology leading to the revenue function π(s;k,l). We then close the model
with the speciﬁcation of the household sector.
Production and market structure: Each ﬁrm produces an intermediate















where pi is the price in units of the ﬁnal good and 1/(1 − η) is the elasticity
of demand.








where ν ≥ 1 determines the return to scale in production. We will consider
both cases of constant return (ν = 1) and increasing return (ν > 1). The
11model with increasing returns captures, in a simple form, the presence of ﬁx
factors and variable capacity utilization. Capital depreciates at rate δ.
Given w the wage rate, the resources of ﬁrm i after production and after
the payment of wages can be written as:







where the term Y 1−η(kθ
il
1−θ
i )νη is the monopoly revenue pixi, after substitut-
ing the demand and production functions.
The assumption made in the previous section that the revenue function
displays decreasing returns is obtained by imposing ην < 1. In equilibrium,
ki = K and li = L for all ﬁrms, and therefore, Y = (KθL1−θ)ν. This implies
that the aggregate production function is homogenous of degree ν.
Household sector: There is a continuum of homogeneous households with
lifetime utility E0
P∞
t=0 βtU(ct,ht), where ct is consumption, ht is labor, and
β is the subjective discount factor. Households are the ﬁrms’ shareholders.
In addition to equity shares, they own non-contingent bonds. The budget
constraint is:
wtht + bt + st(¯ dt + ptqt) + Gt =
bt+1
1 + rt
+ st+1qt + ct + Tt
where wt and rt are the wage and interest rates, bt is the one-period bond,
st the equity shares, ¯ dt the equity payment received from their portfolio
of shares, qt is the market price of the shares of surviving ﬁrms, after the
payment of dividends. The variable Gt are the net capital gains generated
by the creation of new ﬁrms and Tt are lump sum taxes. Taxes are used to
ﬁnance the tax exemption of interests paid by ﬁrms.
Each household owns a diversiﬁed portfolio of shares, and therefore, they
only face the aggregate risk. Because only a fraction pt survives to the next
period, the price qt is multiplied by this probability. The ownership of new
ﬁrms is shared among all existing households independently of their previous
ownership. The mass of new ﬁrms is 1 − pt. A new ﬁrm acquires the equity
capital from an exiting ﬁrm by paying the liquidation value Lt. Therefore,
the net capital gains are given by Gt = (1 − pt)(dt + qt − Lt). The payout
received from incumbent ﬁrms is ¯ dt = ptdt + (1 − pt)Lt.
The ﬁrst order conditions with respect to labor, ht, next period bonds,
bt+1, and next period shares, st+1, are:
wtUc(ct,ht) + Uh(ct,ht) = 0 (6)
12Uc(ct,ht) − β(1 + rt)EUc(ct+1,ht+1) = 0 (7)
Uc(ct,ht)qt − βE(¯ dt+1 + ptqt+1)Uc(ct+1,ht+1) = 0. (8)
These are standard optimizing conditions for the household’s problem. The
ﬁrst two conditions are key to determine the supply of labor and the risk-free
interest rate. The last condition determines the market price of shares. After











Firms’ optimization is consistent with households’ optimization. Therefore,
conditional on survival, the stochastic discount factor used by ﬁrms is mt+j =
βjUc(ct+j,ht+j)/Uc(ct,ht).
General equilibrium: We can now provide the deﬁnition of a recursive
general equilibrium. The suﬃcient set of aggregate states are given by the
survival probability p, the aggregate capital K, and the aggregate bonds B.
Deﬁnition 3.1 (Recursive equilibrium) A recursive competitive equilib-
rium is deﬁned as a set of functions for (i) households’ policies c(s) and
h(s); (ii) ﬁrms’ policies d(s;k,b), k(s;k,b) and b(s;k,b); (iii) ﬁrms’ value
V (s;k,b); (iv) aggregate prices w(s), r(s) and m(s,s0); (v) law of motion for
the aggregate states s0 = H(s). Such that: (i) household’s policies satisfy
the optimality conditions (6)-(7); (ii) ﬁrms’ policy are optimal and V (s;k,b)
satisﬁes the Bellman’s equation (1); (iii) the wage and interest rates are
the equilibrium clearing price in the labor and bond markets and m(s,s0) =
βUc(ct+1,ht+1)/Uc(ct,ht); (iv) the law of motion H(s) is consistent with in-
dividual decisions and the stochastic process for p.
3.3 Some characterization of the equilibrium
To illustrate some of the properties of the model, it will be convenient to
look at some special cases in which the equilibrium can be characterized an-
alytically. First, we show that for a deterministic steady state with constant
p, the default constraint is always binding. Second, if κ = 0, changes in the
survival probability p have no eﬀect on the real variables of the economy.
13Proposition 3.1 The no-default constraint binds in a deterministic steady
state.
In a deterministic steady state m = 1/(1 + r) and ϕd(d) = ϕd(d0). Then,
the ﬁrst order condition for debt, equation (5), can be written as




where the inequality derives from the deﬁnition of R = 1 + r(1 − τ). Due
to the tax advantage in debt, the shareholders would like to issue debt to
pay out dividends. The debt constraint puts a limit to this. In a model with
uncertainty, however, the constraint may not always bind because ﬁrms may
limit debt in anticipation of future shocks, unless τ is suﬃciently high.
Proposition 3.2 With κ = 0, changes in p have no eﬀect on l and k0.
When κ = 0, we have that ϕd(d) = ϕd(d0) = 1. Therefore, the ﬁrst order















Clearly, the retention probability does not enter the ﬁrst order conditions.
Therefore, the only way in which p can aﬀect the production and investment
policy of the ﬁrm is through the change in the multiplier µ or the equilibrium
prices. But suppose that the equilibrium prices r, w and m do not change.
From the third condition we see that the unchanged sequence of prices implies
that the sequence of multipliers µ does not change either. The ﬁrst two
conditions then imply that the production and investment choices of the
ﬁrm do not change. Considering the consumer problem, it can be easily seen
that p drops out of the budget constraint in equilibrium. That is, the losses
from ﬁrms that exit their markets are perfectly oﬀset by the capital gains
associated with starting new ﬁrms. Moreover, changes in debt issuance and
dividend payouts associated with changes in p cancel each other out because
there is no cost associated with changing equity payouts. For these reasons,
14the conjecture unchanged sequence of prices is an equilibrium outcome and
the ﬁnancial restructuring does not aﬀect the real sector of the economy.8
This result no longer holds when κ > 0, that is, when the substitution
between equity and debt is costly. Intuitively, a fall in the value of the ﬁrm
induced by a persistent fall in p requires a reduction in debt. To maintain the
same production and investment, the ﬁrm needs to increase equity. Because
this is costly, the adjustment is done only gradually. In the short-run, then,
the ﬁrm is forced to reduce capital and labor. This mechanism will be shown
numerically in the next section, after the calibration of the model.
4 Quantitative properties
In this section we parameterize the model and show quantitatively how the
economy responds to changes in p.
4.1 Parametrization
We parameterize the model on a quarterly basis and set the discount rate to
β = 0.99. The utility function takes the form U(c,h) = ln(c) + α · ln(1 − l)
and The parameter α is chosen to have an average working time of 0.25. The
tax rate is set to τ = 0.3.
The production function is parameterized as follows. We start by setting
the return to scale parameter ν = 1.5. As we will show in the sensitivity
analysis, this parameter is important for the volatility of measured TFP but
it does not aﬀect in important ways the cyclical properties of other variables
and the impact of ﬁnancial innovations.
Next we choose the elasticity parameter η which aﬀects the price markup.
In the model, the price markup over the average cost is on average equal
to 1/νη − 1. The values commonly used in macro studies range between
10 to 20 percent. We use the intermediate value of 15 percent, that is,
νη = 0.85. Given ν = 1.5, this implies η = 0.567. Then the parameter θ is
chosen to have a capital income share of 40 percent. The required value is
θ = 1 − 0.6/ην = 0.294. Capital depreciates at rate δ = 0.025.
8This neutrality result critically hinges on the particular speciﬁcation of the liquidation
value L(s;k,b) = V (s;k,b)−V (s;0,0). This result does not hold for alternative speciﬁca-
tions of the liquidation value even if κ = 0. However, because the eﬀect is small, it would
not change signiﬁcantly the quantitative results.
15To insure that the ﬁrm’s problem is a well deﬁned concave problem, we
assume that the value of diversion is linear, that is, D(k,l) = χ·k+(1−χ)·l.
The value of χ is such that about half of the divertible funds are associated
with the use of capital and half with the use of labor. The sensitivity analysis
will clarify the role played by this parameter. The enforcement parameter
φ is chosen to replicate the average ratio of debt over GDP in the nonfarm
business sector in the 1952-83 period. The average yearly value is 0.55.
The probability of market survival can take two values, ¯ p ± ∆, with
symmetric transition probabilities. The persistence probability is set to
Γ(p/p) = 0.9. This implies that recessions arise on average every 20 quarters,
which is the approximate frequency over the post-war period. The average
retention probability is set to ¯ p = 0.975. This implies an annual exit rate of
about 10 percent, which is the approximate value for the whole US economy,
see OECD (2001).9
At this point there are only two parameters left. The variability of the
shock, ∆, and the cost parameter, κ. They are chosen jointly to replicate the
standard deviation of GDP and the standard deviation of Net Worth, π −b,
during the ﬁrst sample period, 1952-83. The full set of parameter values is
reported in Table 2.
Table 2: Calibration.
Description Parameter values
Discount factor β = 0.99
Utility parameter α = 0.318
Production technology θ = 0.294, ν = 1.5, δ = 0.025
Elasticity parameter η = 0.567
Market survival p = 0.975 ± 0.013, Γ(p/p) = 0.9
Default parameters χ = 0.2, φ = 3.36
Cost of equities κ = 0.25
Tax rate τ = 0.3
9When weighted by the size of ﬁrms, the exit probability is smaller than 10 percent.
However, the exit rate in our model should be interpreted more broadly than ﬁrms’ exit.
It also includes the partial sales of business activities. When interpreted in this broader
sense, the 10 percent probability is not unreasonable.
164.2 Response to shocks
Suppose that the probability of market retention has been at the high level
¯ p + ∆ = 0.988 for a long period of time and the economy has converged
to the long-term equilibrium. Starting from this equilibrium, the probability
drops to p = 0.962 and stays at this level for several periods (although agents
understand that there is a probability of switching). The top panel of Figure
3 plots the response of output and measured TFP.
Figure 3: Macroeconomic dynamics after a shock.
The computation of TFP requires some explanation. The aggregate pro-
duction function in the model is Y = (KθL1−θ)ν, and therefore, the actual
TFP is constant and equal to 1. However, following the standard account-
ing procedure, we compute the TFP assuming that the production function
takes the standard Cobb-Douglas form, that is, Y = ˆ zK
ˆ θL1−ˆ θ, where ˆ θ 6= θ
is the capital income share. The variable ˆ z is what we identify as measured
17TFP. Because this representation ignores the increasing returns, the variable







which in general increases with the scale of production.
As can be seen from the top panel of Figure 3, the drop in the probability
of market retention generates a large fall in measured TFP and output. After
the initial drop, output stabilizes at a lower level. The long-term drop is a
consequence of the convex adjustment cost. After a negative shock, the
ﬁrm replaces debt with equity until a new shock arrives. When the positive
shock arrives, the ﬁrm increases its leverage by paying more dividends, but
this is costly. To save on this cost, there is an incentive to keep less equity
(compared to the case of no adjustment cost). But with lower equity the
ﬁrm has to invest less.
The response to a positive shock, shown in the second panel of Figure 3, is
symmetric to the impulse response induced by a negative shock. With a high
p the ﬁrm is able to increase its leverage until a negative shock hits. Because
of the possibility of a lower p, requiring a lower leverage, the ﬁrm expects to
reduce its payout at some point in the future, which is also costly. To reduce
this cost, the ﬁrm has an incentive to retain more equity. By retaining more
equity (compared to the case of no adjustment cost) the ﬁrm is able to invest
more.
5 Financial innovations and business cycles
We now study how ﬁnancial markets innovations aﬀect the properties of
the business cycle. We provide ﬁrst some background information about the
changes that have taken place in the ﬁnancial markets and how these changes
are mapped in our model. We then show the business cycle implications
predicted by the model.
5.1 Changes in ﬁnancial markets
We describe two sets of changes. The ﬁrst is in the direction of increasing
the borrowing capability of ﬁrms. The second allows for greater ﬂexibility in
18equity ﬁnancing. In our model, the ﬁrst change is captured by a reduction
in the enforcement parameter φ. The second by a smaller κ.
Collateralization: Recent ﬁnancial market developments have made it
easier for ﬁrms to pledge their assets to lenders, that is, to relax their collat-
eral constraints and increase their leverage. As a major ﬁnancial innovation,
Asset Backed Securities (ABS) created through the process of securitization
have become an eﬀective way of debt collateralization. Securitization began
in the late 70s as a way to ﬁnance residential mortgages. By the second half
of the 80s, securitization was used for automobiles, manufactured housing
and equipment leasing, as well as for credit cards. Growth has been fast
since then and ABS are today an important component of ﬁrm ﬁnancing.
According to The Bond Market Association (2004), ABS issuance overtook
the issuance of long term corporate bonds in the third quarter of 2004.
Cost and ﬂexibility of equity issues: Our simple speciﬁcation of the
adjustment cost in the equity payout encompasses both direct and indirect
costs of changing the equity of the ﬁrm. There is a number of studies sug-
gesting that these costs have changed during the last two decades.
Starting in the early 1980s, share repurchases have become more com-
mon. One change that has favored this is the SEC adoption of a safe harbor
rule (Rule 10b-18) in 1982. This rule guarantees that, under certain condi-
tions, the SEC would not ﬁle manipulation charges against companies that
repurchased shares on the open market. According to Allen and Michaely:
“Evidence suggests that the rise in the popularity of repurchases increased
overall payout and increased ﬁrms ﬁnancial ﬂexibility”.
One of the changes that have contributed to lowering the cost of new
issues, is the ability to make ‘shelf’ oﬀerings under Rule 415. This was
introduced in 1983. Under a shelf oﬀering, a ﬁrm can issue at short notice,
up to a given limit, during a period of 2 years. The study by Bhagat, Marr
& Thompson (1985) ﬁnds that this additional ﬂexibility has allowed ﬁrms
to lower oﬀering costs by 13 percent in syndicated issues and 51 percent in
non-syndicated issues. More generally, this rule has increased the ﬂexibility
of ﬁrms in issuing new shares.
Another important change is the development of the venture capital mar-
ket and the introduction of new trading markets such as NASDAQ. This has
facilitated the access to the equity market of small and medium size ﬁrms,
19increasing their overall ﬁnancial ﬂexibility.
Kim, Palia & Saunders (2003) provide some direct evidence about the
behavior of underwriting cost for new equity issues. They show that under-
writing spreads for seasoned equity oﬀerings have been on average decreas-
ing during the period 1980-2000. The comparison of cross sectional average
spreads in 1980 and 2000 shows a decline of about 20 percent.
5.2 Business cycle implications
The two sets of innovations described above are captured in our model with
changes in the parameters φ and κ. A reduction in φ allows the ﬁrm to take
more debt. A reduction in κ allows for greater ﬂexibility in equity ﬁnance,
that is, greater ﬂexibility in shares repurchases, new issues and dividends.
To evaluate the eﬀect of these innovations we conduct the following exer-
cise. We change φ and κ to replicate the average leverage and volatility of net
worth in the nonfarm business sector in the most recent period 1984-2005.
In the baseline model these two parameters were chosen to replicate the av-
erage leverage and volatility of net worth during the early period 1952-83,
that is, 0.55 and 1.12 respectively. These values have changed to 0.75 and
2.26 for the most recent period 1984-05. All the other parameters are kept
unchanged.
The responses of output for the baseline model and the new parametriza-
tion are reported in the top panels of Figure 4. The continuous line is for
the baseline model (early period) and the dashed line is for the new parame-
trization (late period). As can be seen, the sensitivity of aggregate output
falls dramatically with the new values of φ and κ.
To disentangle the eﬀect deriving from the higher leverage (lower φ) and
from the greater ﬂexibility in equity ﬁnancing (lower κ), the lower sections
of Figure 4 plot the impulse responses when we change only one of the two
parameters. The response of output does not change substantially after a
change in φ.10 On the other hand, the response of output with a lower κ is
almost identical to the response obtained with the simultaneous change of φ
and κ. This ﬁnding suggests that it is not the greater ability to borrow that
10For some parametrizations, the response of output may actually increase with a lower
φ, and thus higher leverage would contribute to greater macroeconomic volatility. A related
point was made by Iacoviello & Minetti (2003) who show that house prices respond more
strongly to interest rate shocks if leverage is high.
20Figure 4: Financial development and macroeconomic dynamics.
21has contributed to the lower macroeconomic volatility. Rather, it derives
from innovations allowing for greater ﬂexibility in equity ﬁnancing.
Table 3 reports standard business cycle statistics computed on model
simulated data, for the early and later periods. As described above, we
change φ and κ so that the model replicates the higher leverage and the
greater volatility of net worth observed in the second part of the sample
period. Therefore, the comparison of these numbers provides an assessment
of the macroeconomic changes induced by ﬁnancial markets innovations as
predicted by the model.
Table 3: Business cycle statistics before and after ﬁnancial innovations.
Early period Late period
(1952-1983) (1984-2005) Late/Early
Data Model Data Model Data Model
Real variables
Output 1.70 1.72 0.86 1.02 0.51 0.59
TFP 0.83 0.75 0.43 0.44 0.52 0.59
Labor 2.21 1.63 1.10 0.97 0.50 0.59
Investment 7.36 9.09 4.79 5.36 0.65 0.59
Consumption 0.93 0.34 0.49 0.18 0.53 0.53
Financial variables
Net Worth 1.12 1.12 2.26 2.25 2.01 2.01
DebtRep 1.09 4.20 1.37 5.84 1.25 1.39
EquPay 0.69 2.51 1.09 4.85 1.56 1.93
Equity Return 0.87 0.97 1.11
Notes: Artiﬁcial data is generated by simulating the model for 10,000 periods. Both artiﬁcial
and real data is detrended using a band-pass ﬁlter that preserve cycles of 1.5-8 years.
The combined reduction in κ and φ reduces the volatility of output as well
as the volatility of other macroeconomic variables. Quantitatively, the model
is roughly able to replicate the lower macroeconomic volatility observed in
the data. The model also generates greater variability for debt repurchases
and equity payouts as fractions of output. The scale of the volatility increase,
as shown in the last column of the table, is similar to the data. However, the
absolute volatility of these two variables is higher than in the data.11
11Remember that the change in κ between the two periods was chosen to match the
volatility of the stock of net worth, not the ﬂows of equity payout and debt repurchase.
22Finally, it is also worth pointing out that the volatility of equity returns
does not increase much in the later period. Therefore, the model is also con-
sistent with the empirical observation that the volatility of aggregate equity
returns has not changed signiﬁcantly. Indeed, the CRSP value-weighted re-
turn at the quarterly frequency has a standard deviation in the later period
(1984-05) that equals 1.06 times the standard deviation of the early period
(1952-83). In the model this ratio equals 1.11. Of course, given the simple
speciﬁcations of the stochastic discount factor and the capital accumulation,
the model cannot generate the amount of volatility observed in the aggregate
stock market.
5.3 Sensitivity analysis
In this section we conduct a sensitivity analysis with respect to two parame-
ters: the return to scale parameter, ν, and the fraction of divertible (liquid)
funds associated with the use of capital, χ. We also consider an alternative
speciﬁcation of the default function.
The top section of Table 4 reports the business cycle statistics when the
production function has constant returns to scale, that is, ν = 1. In changing
ν we also change the elasticity parameter to η = 0.85 so that the markup
over the average cost remains 15 percent. All the other parameters remain
unchanged. As can be seen from the table, the volatility of all real variables
is lower with ν = 1. This could be corrected by increasing the volatility of
p. What matters here, however, is the drop in the volatility of real variables
induced by ﬁnancial innovations. As can be seen in the last column, the drop
in real volatility is not very diﬀerent from the baseline model with ν = 1.5.
The only exception is, of course, the volatility of measured TFP. When the
production function displays constant returns to scale, TFP is no longer
mis-measured. Therefore, the assumption of increasing returns helps us in
capturing an extra feature of the data, that is, the lower TFP volatility, but
it is not crucial for the main results of the paper.
The middle section of Table 4 reports the business cycle statistics when
we increase the share of capital in the repudiation function from χ = 0.2 to
χ = 0.4. This implies that about 27 percent of divertible funds are associated
with the use of labor and 63 percent with the use of capital. In the baseline
model they were both 50 percent. In changing χ we also change φ (the
enforcement parameter) so that the average leverage is as in the baseline
model. Also in this case we observe that ﬁnancial innovations lead to a large
23Table 4: Business cycle statistics. Sensitivity analysis.
Early period Late period
(1952-1983) (1984-2005) Late/Early
Constant return to scale, ν = 1
Real variables
Output 0.85 0.47 0.55
TFP 0.00 0.00 –
Labor 1.21 0.67 0.55
Investment 4.72 2.47 0.52
Consumption 0.18 0.08 0.44
Financial variables
Net Worth 1.49 2.57 1.72
DebtRep 4.29 6.11 1.42
EquPay 3.09 5.46 1.76
Equity Return 0.83 0.92 1.11
Higher share of k in repudiation, χ = 0.4
Real variables
Output 1.69 0.76 0.45
TFP 0.73 0.33 0.45
Labor 1.60 0.73 0.46
Investment 10.25 4.21 0.41
Consumption 0.39 0.14 0.36
Financial variables
Net Worth 1.55 2.67 1.72
DebtRep 5.24 6.59 1.26
EquPay 3.63 5.83 1.61
Equity Return 0.91 0.95 1.04
Default value proportional to output
Real variables
Output 0.98 0.70 0.71
TFP 0.43 0.30 0.70
Labor 0.93 0.67 0.72
Investment 4.84 3.49 0.72
Consumption 0.21 0.13 0.62
Financial variables
Net Worth 0.75 1.77 2.36
DebtRep 2.59 4.39 1.69
EquPay 1.65 3.72 2.25
Equity Return 0.84 0.92 1.09
Notes: Artiﬁcial data is generated by simulating the model for 10,000
periods. Both artiﬁcial and real data is detrended using a band-pass ﬁlter
that preserve cycles of 1.5-8 years.
24drop in macroeconomic volatility.
In the bottom section of Table 4 we report the business cycle statistics for
an alternative speciﬁcation of the default function. In particular, we assume
that the value of defaulting is proportional to output, that is, φ(kθl1−θ)ν. As
can be seen from the table, ﬁnancial innovations lead to a sizable drop in
business cycle volatility, as in the other cases.
A further speciﬁcation of the repudiation value would be φk0, that is, the
value of defaulting is proportional to the new input of capital. We would like
to emphasize that this speciﬁcation would generate similar results as those
reported in Table 3. The reason we did not use this formulation is because
it generates the unattractive result that ﬁrst period consumption increases
after a negative shock. This does not happen with the speciﬁcation of the
repudiation value used in the paper.
6 Technology shocks
The analysis conducted so far has considered only shocks aﬀecting asset prices
but has abstracted from technology shocks. What would be the impact of
ﬁnancial innovations when the main driving force of the business cycle are
standard technology shocks? In this section we address this question by
replacing the shock to the retention probability p with standard TFP shocks.
The production function is speciﬁed as x = z(kθl1−θ)ν. In the previous
sections, the variable z was a constant. We now assume that z follows a two-
state symmetric Markov process with persistence probability Γ(z/z) = 0.9.
The variability of z is chosen to replicate the standard deviation of GDP
in the ﬁrst sample period, 1952-83. All parameters are as in the baseline
calibration. The only exception is the volatility of the retention probability
∆ which is set to zero, and therefore, p = ¯ p.
To evaluate the impact of ﬁnancial innovations, we reduce the values of
φ and κ as we did in Section 5. As shown in Table 5, ﬁnancial innovations
lead to greater, not lower volatility. Therefore, when the main driving force
of the business cycle are standard productivity shocks, the type of ﬁnancial
innovations discussed earlier generate greater macroeconomic volatility.
This result can be explained as follows. Within this model, ﬁnancial
frictions reduce the ﬁnancial ﬂexibility of ﬁrms. With lower ﬂexibility, ﬁrms
react more slowly to productivity changes. Financial innovations increase
their ﬂexibility, and allow them to react faster to these changes. As a result,
25Table 5: Business cycle statistics with TFP shocks.
Early period Late period
(1952-1983) (1984-2005) Late/Early
Data Model Data Model Data Model
Real variables
Output 1.70 1.71 0.86 1.94 0.51 1.13
TFP 0.83 1.21 0.43 1.30 0.52 1.07
Labor 2.21 0.84 1.10 1.06 0.50 1.26
Investment 7.36 7.93 4.79 9.05 0.65 1.14
Consumption 0.93 0.45 0.49 0.50 0.53 1.11
Financial variables
Net Worth 1.12 0.64 2.26 0.85 2.01 1.32
DebtRep 1.09 0.71 1.37 1.17 1.25 1.64
EquPay 0.69 0.82 1.09 1.17 1.56 1.43
Equity Return 0.15 0.17 1.13
Notes: Artiﬁcial data is generated by simulating the model for 10,000 periods. Both artiﬁcial
and real data is detrended using a band-pass ﬁlter that preserve cycles of 1.5-8 years.
innovations lead to greater business cycle volatility.
While this section shows that in our framework ﬁnancial innovations
would not lead to milder business cycles in an economy driven by standard
productivity shocks, it doesn’t necessarily rule out productivity shocks as
a source of business cycle ﬂuctuations. In particular, if one were to build
a model where productivity shocks lead to larger asset price movements,
ﬁnancial innovations could then have a stabilizing eﬀect.
7 Conclusion
During the last two decades, the volatility of the US business cycle has
declined signiﬁcantly. This paper investigates the role played by ﬁnancial
innovations. It develops a general equilibrium model where business cycle
ﬂuctuations are driven by assets price shocks that are propagated to the real
sector of the economy through ﬁnancial markets frictions. By dampening
the real impact of these shocks, ﬁnancial innovations lead to lower macroeco-
nomic volatility. Our theory is consistent with the observation that, although
the real sector of the economy has become less volatile, the volatility of the
ﬁnancial structure of ﬁrms has increased during the last two decades.
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A Data sources
Financial data is from the Flow of Funds Accounts compiled by the Federal
Reserve Board. Outstanding debt is ‘Credit Market Instruments’ of Nonfarm
Nonﬁnancial Corporate Business (B.102, line 22) and Nonfarm Noncorporate
Business (B.103, line 24). This includes mainly Corporate Bonds (for the cor-
porate part), mortgages and bank loans (for corporate and noncorporate);
it doesn’t include trade and tax payables. Debt Repurchases are deﬁned
as the negative of ‘Net Increases in Liabilities’ for the Nonﬁnancial Corpo-
rate Business (F.102, line 36) and for the Noncorporate Business (F103, line
21). Equity Payout in the Nonﬁnancial Corporate Business is ‘Net Divi-
dends’ (F.102, line 3) minus ‘Net New Equity Issue’ (F.102, line 38). Equity
Payout in the Noncorporate Sector is the negative of ‘Proprietors’ Net In-
vestment’ (F103, line 29). Net Worth is as reported by the Flow of Funds in
the Nonﬁnancial Corporate Business (B.102, line 32) and in the Noncorpo-
rate Business (B.103, line 31). All macro variables are from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA).
B Enforcement constraint
In addition to kt, production requires working capital. Higher is the scale of
production, captured by the production inputs kt and lt, and bigger is the
required working capital. We denote it by ft = D(kt,lt). Working capital
consists of liquid funds that are used at the beginning of the period and are
recovered at the end of the period when all transactions are completed. For
simplicity we assume that the ﬁrm borrows these funds at the beginning of
the period and returns them at the end of the period. Because this is an
intra-period loan, there are no interests.
The ﬁrm could divert these funds at the end of the period and default.
Default will lead to the renegotiation of the loan. Suppose that in case of
default the lender can conﬁscate the ﬁrm and recover ψV t, that is, a fraction
of the ﬁrm’s value (ψ < 1). Denote by β the bargaining power of the ﬁrm and
1 − β the bargaining power of the lender. Bargaining is over the repayment
of the debt, which we denote by ˆ ft. If they reach an agrement, the ﬁrm gets
ft − ˆ ft + V t and the lender gets ˆ ft. If there is no agreement, the ﬁrm gets
27the threat value ft and the lender gets the threat value ψV t. Therefore, the
net value for the ﬁrm is V t − ˆ ft and the net value for the lender is ˆ ft −ψV t.




(V t − ˆ ft)
β( ˆ ft − ψV t)
1−β

Taking the ﬁrst order conditions and solving we get ˆ ft = [1 − β(1 − ψ)]V t.
Incentive-compatibility requires that the value of not defaulting, V t, is not
smaller than the value of defaulting, ft− ˆ ft+V t. Using ˆ ft = [1−β(1−ψ)]V t,





1 − β(1 − ψ)
#
ft
Deﬁne φ = 1/[1 − α(1 − ψ)]. Remembering that ft = D(kt,lt), the
enforcement constraint can be written as V t ≥ φD(kt,lt). It is worth noticing
that lower values of φ can be interpreted either as a decrease in the bargaining
power of ﬁrms, β, or as an increase in the recovery rate, ψ. Both changes
lead to greater enforcement of debt contracts.
C First order conditions
Consider the optimization problem (1) and let λ and µ be the Lagrange
multipliers associate with the two constraints. Taking derivatives we get:
l : λπl(s;k,l) − µφDl(k,l) = 0
d : 1 − λϕd(d) = 0
k
0 : (1 + µ)V k(s;k
0,b
0) − λ = 0
b






Given the deﬁnition of V (s;k0,b0) provided in (2) and taking into account















28The envelope conditions are:
Vk(s;k,b) = λπk(s;k,l) − µφDk(k,l)
Vb(s;k,b) = −λ
Using the ﬁrst condition to eliminate λ and substituting the envelope condi-
tions we get conditions (3)-(5).
D Solution strategy
Consider the following equations:
wUc(c,h) + Uh(c,h) = 0 (9)
Uc(c,h) − β(1 + r)EUc(c
0,h
0) = 0 (10)
wh + b −
b0
1 + r
+ d − c − T = 0 (11)
πl(s;k,l) − µφDl(k,l)ϕd(d) = 0 (12)














0) ≥ φD(k,l) (15)




0 − ϕ(d) = 0 (16)
Equations (9)-(11) are the ﬁrst order conditions for households and the
budget constraint. Equations (12)-(14) are the ﬁrst order conditions for ﬁrms.
The last two equations are the enforcement and budget constraints.
The computational procedure is based on the following observation: If
we knew the terms V (s;k0,b0), V k(s;k0,b0), V b(s;k0,b0), and EβUc(c0,h0), we
could solve the eight conditions (9)-(16) for the unknowns c,h,w,r,µ,d,b0,k0.
29The numerical procedure is then based on the approximation of these four
functions. We create a two-dimensional grid for k and b. For each value of
the shock p, we guess the values of the four functions at each grid point.
The grid points are joined with bilinear functions so that the approximated
functions are continuous. At this point we solve for the eight variables at
each grid point and update the initial guesses until convergence.
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